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Sara Anne Hook, M.B.A., J.D.  
[N.B. All references to the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct are taken from Indiana Rules 
of Court, Rules of Professional Conduct, Including Amendments made through April 30th, 
2015, http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/prof_conduct/prof_conduct.pdf, accessed 5/13/16.) 
 
A. Cooperation Among Attorneys 
 
One of the underlying principles with the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) back in December 2006 was to encourage cooperation among lawyers in the 
face of increasing amounts of evidence in digital formats, designated by the new terminology 
“electronically stored information” or ESI.  One of the requirements under the revised FRCP was 
the concept of a “meet and confer” conference that would result in a discovery plan that would 
speed the timing of discovery, streamline the process and reduce costs as much as possible.  In 
terms of the content of the conference, Rule 26(f)(2) Conference Content; Parties’ 
Responsibilities states that:  
In conferring, the parties must consider the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and 
the possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the case; make or arrange for the 
disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1); discuss any issues about preserving discoverable 
information; and develop a proposed discovery plan. The attorneys of record and all 
unrepresented parties that have appeared in the case are jointly responsible for arranging the 
conference, for attempting in good faith to agree on the proposed discovery plan, and for 
submitting to the court within 14 days after the conference a written report outlining the plan. 
The court may order the parties or attorneys to attend the conference in person. (Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Legal Information Institute, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_26, accessed 5/13/16.)   
Rule 26(f)(3) provides guidance on what should be included in a discovery plan: 
A discovery plan must state the parties’ views and proposals on: 
(A) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for disclosures 
under Rule 26(a), including a statement of when initial disclosures were made or will be 
made; 
(B) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be 
completed, and whether discovery should be conducted in phases or be limited to or 
focused on particular issues; 
(C) any issues about disclosure, discovery, or preservation of electronically stored 
information, including the form or forms in which it should be produced; 
(D) any issues about claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation materials, 
including—if the parties agree on a procedure to assert these claims after production—
whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 502;  
(E) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under these 
rules or by local rule, and what other limitations should be imposed; and 
(F) any other orders that the court should issue under Rule 26(c) or under Rule 16(b) and 
(c). (Id.)  
Note especially the very short time period for all of this to happen, while Rule 26(f)(4) allows for 
an even more ambitious timeframe if allowed under local rules.  What does this mean?  Lawyers 
must cooperate.   
 In December 2015, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were revised again, with 
particular attention paid to proportionality and the opportunity for sanctions.  However, FRCP is 
interesting in that it requires everyone, not just lawyers, to cooperate in the litigation process: 
Rule 1: Requires parties, as well as courts, to construe, administer, and employ the Rules in 
a manner "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding." The Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure ("Committee") notes 
that: "Effective advocacy is consistent with — and indeed depends upon — cooperative and 
proportional use of procedure." (Randy Wu, Summary of December 2015 Amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Orrick, December 7, 2015, 
https://www.orrick.com/Events-and-Publications/Pages/Summary-of-December-2015-
Amendments-to-the-Federal-Rules-of-Civil-Procedure.aspx, accessed 5/13/16.) 
Other revisions should encourage cooperation between lawyers, including Rules 4(m), 16, 
26(d)(2) and 34(b)(2)(a), which reduce the time periods for various activities to happen.  In 
addition, Rule 34 has been revised in ways that encourage cooperation and reduce the 
opportunity for dilatory tactics: 
Rule 34: Boilerplate objections are prohibited and objections must "state with specificity 
the grounds for objecting" and "whether any responsive materials are being withheld." 
The Committee notes: "An objection may state that a request is overbroad, but . . . should 
state the scope that is not overbroad." An objection that "states the limits that have 
controlled the search for responsive and relevant materials"—which might include the 
date range or the scope of sources or search terms used—"qualifies as a statement that the 
materials have been 'withheld.'" Furthermore, this Rule includes a new provision that 
"[t]he production must then be completed no later than the time for inspection specified 
in the request or another reasonable time specified in the response." This new provision 
appears to limit the parties' ability to engage in unconstrained rolling productions. (Id.) 
In terms of Rule 26(b)(1)’s focus on proportionality, the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil 
Procedure noted that a party “may not refuse discovery simply by making a boilerplate objection 
that it is not proportional.” (Id.)   As part of the revisions to Rule 37(e) on sanctions, the 
Committee noted that the rule recognizes that “reasonable steps” to preserve suffice; it does not 
call for perfection.” (Id.) 
B. Using Rules of Professionalism and Civility to Maintain Cooperation 
 
The Preamble to the Indiana Rules of Professional Responsibility includes some powerful 
statements about the role of the lawyer in the administration of justice and offers beautiful and 
compelling sentiments about the responsibilities that this entails, both within and outside the 
courtroom.  Here are some examples:   
  [1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an 
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of 
justice. Whether or not engaging in the practice of law, lawyers should conduct themselves 
honorably. 
   [5] A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in 
professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer should 
use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A 
lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including 
judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to 
challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process. 
[8] A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system 
and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a 
lawyer can be an effective advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice 
is being done. So also, a lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves 
the public interest because people are more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their 
legal obligations, when they know their communications will be private. 
[13] Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role 
requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system. 
Many sections of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct help lawyers to aspire to the 
highest standards of professionalism in how they conduct themselves and how they treat other 
lawyers, judges, parties, witnesses and others who may be part of the judicial process.  For 
example: 
Rule 3.1. Meritorious Claims and Contentions 
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a 
basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the 
respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding 
as to require that every element of the case be established. 
Rule 3.2. Expediting Litigation 
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. 
Rule 3.3. Candor Toward the Tribunal 
(a)    A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1)     make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of 
material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; 
(2)    fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the 
lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing 
counsel; or 
(3)    offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness 
called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its 
falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, 
disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony 
of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. 
(b)    A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person 
intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the 
proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the 
tribunal. 
(c)     The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and 
apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. 
(d)    In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the 
lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are 
adverse. 
  
Rule 3.4. Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel 
A lawyer shall not: 
(a)    unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a 
document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or 
assist another person to do any such act; 
(b)    falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness 
that is prohibited by law; 
(c)     knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based 
on an assertion that no valid obligation exists; 
(d)    in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent 
effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party; 
(e)    in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will 
not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except 
when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the 
credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused; 
or 
(f)     request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to 
another party unless: 
(1)     the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and 
(2)    the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by 
refraining from giving such information. 
Rule 4.1. Truthfulness in Statements to Others 
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(a)    make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or 
(b)    fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a 
criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6. 
Rule 4.2. Communication with Person Represented by Counsel 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a 
person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the 
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law or a court order. 
Rule 4.3. Dealing with Unrepresented Persons 
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or 
imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the 
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable 
efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person, 
other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of 
such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client. 
Rule 4.4. Respect for Rights of Third Persons 
(a)    In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other 
than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that 
violate the legal rights of such a person. 
(b)    A lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer's client and 
knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly 
notify the sender. 
 
In addition to what is provided in the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct, a number of 
courts and bar associations have adopted statements on civility.  (See Civility Principles, United 
States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, December 3, 2007, 
https://www.mied.uscourts.gov/PDFFIles/08-AO-009.pdf, accessed 5/13/16.) For example, the 
Indianapolis Bar Association has Standards of Professionalism that are intended “[t]o foster 
respect and trust among lawyers and the public, to promote the fair and efficient resolution of 
disputes, to simplify transactions and to make the practice of law more enjoyable and satisfying.” 
(Standards of Professionalism, Indianapolis Bar Association, 
https://www.indybar.org/index.cfm?pg=Professionalism-HomePage, accessed 5/13/16.) The 
standards address commitment, character, competence, courtesy and community involvement.  
Standard IV. Courtesy states that “[w]e will at all times act with dignity, civility, decency and 
courtesy in all professional activities and will refrain from rude, disruptive, disrespectful, 
obstructive and abusive behavior.” (Id.)  Many bar associations, including the Indianapolis Bar 
Association, have resource materials available to encourage professionalism and civility and 
many promote professionalism their members with awards for civility.  For example, the 
Litigation Section of the Indiana State Bar Association is currently requesting nominations for its 
Civility Award, which recognizes an attorney and judge for outstanding civility and 
professionalism in their dealings with fellow judges, attorneys, parties, witnesses and the public. 
(https://inbar.site-ym.com/page/civilityawards, accessed 5/13/16.)   
One thing that the author has observed over the years since she finished law school is a 
softening of the concept of “zealous advocacy.”  In some situations, this phrase seemed to be an 
excuse for lack of civility, professionalism and decorum in the courtroom.  However, this 
concept is still found in the Preamble to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: 
[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As advisor, a 
lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and 
obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously 
asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a 
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of 
honest dealings with others. As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client's legal 
affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others. 
Similar language is also found in the Comment to Rule 1.3 Diligence: 
[1] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction 
or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures 
are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with 
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon 
the client's behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that 
might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise 
professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. 
See Rule 1.2. The lawyer's duty to act with reasonable diligence does not require the use 
of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal process 
with courtesy and respect. 
However, this concept is missing from the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct.  Interestingly, 
lack of cooperation and/or inaccurate representations is one of the checkboxes in the database of 
cases on electronic discovery provided by K&L Gates: 
 A quick search of this database yields a number of recent cases where cooperation – or lack of it 
– was a central issue in discovery disputes.  These are costly issues which waste time, add to the 
expense of litigation and can result in sanctions against the client and the lawyer.   
C. Confidentiality and Data Security 
 
Technology has brought many improvements to the practice of law and is often 
considered by commentators to be the great equalizer in law practice because it allows solo 
practitioners and small firms to compete against larger firms and provides an opportunity to 
realize real efficiencies in the delivery of legal services.  However, that same technology can 
pose substantial risks, particularly with respect to confidentiality.  The author teaches a full- 
semester course on cyber-security, with special emphasis on security in law firms, as well as a 
full-semester course on electronic discovery, an important subset within legal technology that 
presents a number of concerns with client confidentiality and the waiver of attorney-client and 
attorney work-product privilege.  In thinking about data security in law firms, one of the first 
principles to keep in mind is embodied in Rule 1.1 Competence, particularly Comment 6 
(Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct): 
Rule 1.1. Competence 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. 
Maintaining Competence 
          [6]    To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the 
law and its practice, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal 
education requirements to which the lawyer is subject. 
 
Many commentators asserted that the phrase “and its practice” included the intentional, 
appropriate and careful use of technology.  This view was manifested in the revisions to the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as part of the Ethics 20/20 Project.  For example, 
Comment 8 to ABA Model Rule 1.1 states that: 
Maintaining Competence 
[8] To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the 
law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, engage 
in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements 
to which the lawyer is subject. 
 Since one of the main risks of using technology is the threat to client confidentiality, it is 
worth reviewing the major rule and comments that relate to this.  From the Indiana Rules of 
Professional Conduct, here is Rule 1.6(a) and Comments 16 and 17.  
Rule 1.6. Confidentiality of Information 
(a)    A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client gives 
informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation 
or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b). 
 
Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality 
          [16] A lawyer must act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client 
against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the 
representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer's supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3. 
          [17] When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of 
a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the 
hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security 
measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy. Special 
circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. Factors to be considered in determining the 
reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and 
the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. 
A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule or may 
give informed consent to the use of a means of communication that would otherwise be prohibited by this 
Rule. 
 
However, Comments 18 and 19 to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6 
provide more detailed guidance.   
Acting Competently to Preserve Confidentiality 
[18]   Paragraph (c) requires a lawyer to act competently to safeguard information relating to the 
representation of a client against unauthorized access by third parties and against inadvertent or 
unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the 
representation of the client or who are subject to the lawyer’s supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 
5.3.  The unauthorized access to, or the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, information 
relating to the representation of a client does not constitute a violation of paragraph (c) if the 
lawyer has made reasonable efforts to prevent the access or disclosure.  Factors to be considered 
in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to, the 
sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not 
employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the 
safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to 
represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to 
use). A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this 
Rule or may give informed consent to forgo security measures that would otherwise be required 
by this Rule.  Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps to safeguard a client’s 
information in order to comply with other law, such as state and federal laws that govern data 
privacy or that impose notification requirements upon the loss of, or unauthorized access to, 
electronic information, is beyond the scope of these Rules.  For a lawyer’s duties when sharing 
information with nonlawyers outside the lawyer’s own firm, see Rule 5.3, Comments [3]-
[4].        
[19]   When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the 
representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information 
from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. This duty, however, does not require that 
the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Special circumstances, however, may warrant special precautions. 
Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer's expectation of 
confidentiality include the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of 
the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement. A client may require 
the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule or may give 
informed consent to the use of a means of communication that would otherwise be prohibited by 
this Rule.  Whether a lawyer may be required to take additional steps in order to comply with 
other law, such as state and federal laws that govern data privacy, is beyond the scope of these 
Rules. 
There are many excellent sources of information on how law firms can increase the 
security of their data, their systems and their operations, particularly sensitive information 
relating to clients.   One place to start is the website for Sensei Enterprises, Inc. (Sensei 
Enterprises, Inc., http://senseient.com/, accessed 5/13/16.)  Nelson (lawyer) and Simek 
(engineer) have been leaders in information security, electronic discovery and data forensics for 
many years.  This company’s website is a treasure trove of information, including articles, blogs, 
podcasts and YouTube videos.  Lawyers are encouraged to register for the free article 
distribution service.  Nelson and Simek, along with colleague David G. Ries, have published a 
number of excellent books, including Locked Down:  Practical Information Security for 
Lawyers, 2nd ed. (American Bar Association, 2016, ISBN 978-1-63425-414-4).  The author used 
the first edition of this book as one of her two textbooks in her course on cyber-security and is 
delighted that a new edition is available.  Likewise from the ABA is Information Security and 
Privacy:  A Practical Guide for Global Executives, Lawyers and Technologists by Thomas Shaw 
(American Bar Association, 2011, ISBN 978-1-61632-807-8), the other textbook used in the 
author’s course.  Communication with Mr. Shaw indicates that a new edition of his book is 
planned for release in 2016.  In the meantime, the content of the 1st edition has been updated by 
articles in the Information Law Journal, which is a publication of the Information Security and 
EDDE Committees, ABA Section of Science & Technology Law. 
(http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=ST230002, accessed 5/13/16.)  As 
reported in the May 2016 issue of ABA Journal, cyber-security was a major theme at the ABA 
Techshow 2016.  (Victor Li, Private Lines:  Cybersecurity Issues and Advice Steal the 
Techshow, ABA Journal, May 2016, p. 32.) It is interesting to track the increasing awareness of 
lawyers about the serious subject of cyber-security, as evidenced by the ABA’s annual 
technology survey (ABA Techreport 2015, 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/techreport/2015.html, accessed 5/13/16.)  Among the 
topics that David Ries includes in his summary of the security portion of the report are statistics 
on security breaches by size of law firm, security programs and policies, cyber-insurance 
coverage, authentication and access control, encryption, basic security tools and disaster 
recovery/business continuity.   
Another excellent source of information on confidentiality and data security is the 
International Legal Technology Association (ILTA), which law firms can join for very modest 
annual dues based on the size of the law firm (http://www.iltanet.org/get-involved/membership, 
accessed 5/13/2016.)  ILTA publishes a quarterly journal, Peer to Peer, as well as White Papers, 
surveys, conferences, virtual events and local meetings.  Many of the virtual events are free or 
very low cost.  The author has used ILTA’s webinars in her courses and there are also podcasts 
and recordings of various events.  One of the communities within ILTA is LegalSEC, designed 
to cover cyber-security issues in law firms.  
(http://connect.iltanet.org/resources/legalsec?ssopc=1, accessed 5/13/16.)   
One risk to confidentiality that lawyers do not necessarily think about is metadata.  
Defined as “data about data”, most metadata is generated automatically by various software, 
including Word, without the user even being aware of it.  Yet metadata can reveal information 
that would be damaging to a client or a case, including who authored and revised a document, 
the dates of creation and revision, etc.  Some metadata can be revealed by easily-accessed 
features of the software itself.  For example, this simple screen under Info in Word provides a 
wealth of information about my section of the seminar manual.  
 
I can see additional information just by clicking Show All Properties at the bottom of the screen.  
 I can use the Inspect Document feature to check for issues with the document, such as for the 
document’s properties and the author’s name: 
 
Prior to transmitting a document, its metadata should be removed via one of the prescribed 
methods.  Although many people believe that converting the document to PDF format will be 
enough to remove metadata, others caution that this is not necessarily always effective.  The 
ABA’s website has a compilation of ethics opinions related to metadata the U.S. (Metadata 
Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/resources/c
harts_fyis/metadatachart.html, accessed 5/13/16.)  Of course, if litigation can be reasonably 
anticipated, the lawyer and the client are under a duty to preserve any potentially relevant ESI 
(electronically stored information) in its native format with metadata intact.   
One of the biggest risks to confidentiality and data security is social media.  As indicated 
in the next section, the author has given presentations and published materials on the ethical 
issues with a lawyer’s use of social media.  The immediacy and informality of social media often 
means that people are not as circumspect about what they choose to post and share, which can 
result in revealing confidential client information.  Moreover, most courts have said that what is 
posted on social media is nearly always discoverable and admissible.  The law firm will want to 
have policies about the use of social media, not only for its lawyers, but also for its internal staff 
as well as any third-party contractors it might be using.  First, the law firm will need an 
Acceptable Use Policy that covers all use of technology (social media, Internet, email, texting, 
telephone, photocopier, etc.) that includes the right to monitor.  Second, the law firm will want to 
have ongoing training about the risks of social media, especial as it relates to client 
confidentiality.  Third, if the law firm is going to be active in social media, it will need someone 
in charge of this process, standards and policies and a vetting of anything that is going to be 
posted.   Fourth, the law firm will also need proper oversight of any third-party providers and 
contract lawyers, with a contract or Service Level Agreement covering security, privacy, etc.  
Finally, it is important to note that the continued blurring of personal and professional lives 
through allowing personal devices (BYOD) only increases the risks.   
The client’s use of social media poses risks to confidentiality.  One recommendation is to 
have a thorough conversation with the client about how he/she would like to be communicated 
with. This information should be included in the representation letter.  This is an opportunity to 
alert the client to the risks of communicating through a public fax, an employer-provided email 
system, an email system where family members have access to each other’s messages or share 
the same login and password or talking loudly in public on a cell phone, all of which can waive 
the attorney-client privilege.  Social media is especially tempting for clients – it is so easy to post 
information about an opposing party (soon-to-be ex-spouse) or reveal information that would be 
adverse to a client’s case (mountain climbing when claiming to be injured and unable to work).  
Social media provides a particularly rich repository of evidence in bankruptcy (see article by 
Hook and Taht). Lawyers do use social media extensively to find information about opposing 
parties, judges, witnesses, etc., so clients should be made aware of this.   On the other hand, the 
client should be admonished not to alter, change or remove information from his/her social 
media site once litigation is reasonably anticipated, because doing so could bring a claim of 
spoliation.  However, note that one of the major revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
was to Rule 37(e), which attempts to clarify when sanctions are available for spoliation.   
D. Rules Against Ex Parte Communications 
 
An ex parte communication occurs “when a party to a case, or someone involved with a 
party, talks or writes to or otherwise communicates directly with the judge about the issues in the 
case without the other parties' knowledge.” (Why Can’t I Talk or Write to the Judge?, 
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/self-help/exparte/ex_parte_contact, accessed 5/11/16) The Indiana 
Rules of Professional Conduct provide excellent guidance and commentary on the ethical issues 
of ex parte communications.   
Rule 3.5. Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal 
A lawyer shall not: 
(a)    seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law; 
(b)    communicate ex parte with such a person during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by 
law or court order; 
(c)     communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if: 
(1)     the communication is prohibited by law or court order; 
(2)    the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or 
(3)    the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment. 
(d)    engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal. 
Comment 
          [1]     Many forms of improper influence upon a tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. Others are 
specified in the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, with which an advocate should be familiar. A lawyer 
is required to avoid contributing to a violation of such provisions. 
          [2]    During a proceeding a lawyer may not communicate ex parte with persons serving in an official 
capacity in the proceeding, such as judges, masters or jurors, unless authorized to do so by law or court 
order. 
          [3]    A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror or prospective juror after the jury 
has been discharged. The lawyer may do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order 
but must respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper 
conduct during the communication. 
          [4]    The advocate's function is to present evidence and argument so that the cause may be decided 
according to law. Refraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate's right to 
speak on behalf of litigants. A lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge but should avoid 
reciprocation; the judge's default is no justification for similar dereliction by an advocate. An advocate can 
present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review and preserve professional integrity by patient 
firmness no less effectively than by belligerence or theatrics. 
          [5]    The duty to refrain from disruptive conduct applies to any proceeding of a tribunal, including a 
deposition. See Rule 1.0(m). 
 
In addition to looking at the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers who are going to be 
practicing in a particular court or jurisdiction should consult the local rules of that court for 
potential rules and restrictions on ex parte communications.   
 It is important to note that lawyers in Indiana do face disciplinary action for ex parte 
communications.  For example, a lawyer in Tippecanoe County received a private reprimand 
after the Indiana Supreme Court determined that she had violated Rule 3.5(b) when an 
emergency petition for a temporary guardian appointment was presented to the judge before 
notice was presented to the parents.  (Jennifer Nelson, Attorney Reprimanded for Ex Parte 
Communication, The Indiana Lawyer, October 15, 2015, 
http://www.theindianalawyer.com/attorney-reprimanded-for-ex-parte-
communication/PARAMS/article/38478, accessed 5/13/16.) As reported in the article, “[t]he 
respondent did not provide advanced notice to the mother or putative father before presenting the 
petition to the judge, nor did she comply with Trial Rule 65(B), requiring her to certify to the 
court any efforts made to give notice to the adverse parties and the reasons supporting a claim 
that notice should not be required.” (Id.)  In another example, the Indiana Supreme Court found 
that a lawyer had committed misconduct by engaging in an improper ex parte communication 
with a judge and in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.  (Marcia Oddi, Ind. 
Decisions – Supreme Court Suspends an Attorney for Improper Ex Parte Communication with a 
Judge, The Indiana Law Blog, December 27, 2010, 
http://indianalawblog.com/archives/2010/12/ind_decisions_s_632.html, accessed 5/13/16.) For 
this conduct, the lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for 30 days with automatic 
reinstatement, concluding that she had violated both Rule 3.5(b) and Rule 8.4(d), with Justice 
Sullivan advocating for a harsher penalty.  As the court noted, “[a]lthough Respondent was 
motivated by genuine concern for her client at a time of apparent crisis, we conclude that 
Respondent's disregard for the orderly administration of justice and the rights of opposing parties 
is serious enough to warrant a brief suspension from the practice of law in this state.” (Id.) 
This author has published on and given presentations about the ethical issues with a 
lawyer’s use of social media.  Among the many risks of social media that have been identified 
are competence, diligence, supervision, confidentiality, privilege, attorney-client relationships, 
conflicts of interest, unauthorized practice of law (UPL), marketing/advertising, solicitation and 
honesty in communications (see Steven C. Bennett, Ethics of Lawyer Social Networking, 73 
Albany Law Review 113 (2009).)  However, Hoover has identified ex parte communications as 
being another risk posed by social media.  (John David Hoover, Law Tips:  Social Media & 
Legal Ethics – Part 1, ICLEF, August 7, 2012, http://iclef.org/2012/08/law-tips-social-media-
legal-ethics-part-1/, accessed 5/13/16.)  In terms of ex parte communications, the article 
considers the ethical breaches of both judges and lawyers by reporting on examples of this 
behavior in South Dakota and North Carolina:   
Under Indiana’s Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2, Rule 2.9, any ex parte 
communications of any kind between a judge and counsel must be avoided at all costs. 
This applies to social media, or otherwise. See also, Ind. R. Prof. Cond. 3.5.  The South 
Dakota Supreme Court recently issued an opinion addressing the issue of allegedly ex 
parte communications with a judge on Facebook.  In Onnen v. Sioux Falls Independent 
School District #49-5, 801 N.W.2d 752 (S.D. 2011), the plaintiff appealed a denial of his 
motion for a new trial based on the alleged bias of the presiding trial court judge. During 
the trial, one of the major witnesses posted a “happy birthday” message on the judge’s 
Facebook “wall.”  The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a new trial, 
finding that the message was not, by definition, an ex parte communication, because it 
was not related to any court action. Rather, it was only incidental contact between the 
judge and a witness, and there was no indication that the message improperly influenced 
the judge in any way. 
The North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission publicly reprimanded a judge for 
engaging in ex parte communications with a lawyer appearing before him in a child 
custody dispute. See North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission, Inquiry No. 08-234, 
Public Reprimand of B. Carlton Terry, Jr. The judge and attorney were Facebook 
“friends” with one another. During an in-chambers meeting, the judge and lawyers were 
reviewing testimony that suggested one of the parties was having an affair. One of the 
lawyers stated, “I will have to see if I can prove a negative.”  That night, the judge 
checked the lawyers Facebook account and saw where he had posted “how do I prove a 
negative?”  The judge then posted to his account that he had “two good parents to choose 
from” but felt that “he will be back in court” referring to the case not being settled. The 
lawyer then posted, “I have a wise judge.”  The Commission concluded that these 
messages constituted ex parte communications with counsel for a party in a matter being 
tried before him, thereby violating several canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. (Id.) 
Hoover goes on to observe that:  
 
Obviously, under Rule 3.5 of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct, the conclusion 
would be the same for this type of conduct as to the lawyer. The informal nature of social 
networking may lead a lawyer to engage in communications that he or she would never 
dream of doing face to face. The simple rule to follow with regards to ex parte 
communications is that, if you cannot do it in the real world, don’t do it in the virtual 
world. (Id.) 
 
E. Identifying and Avoiding Conflicts of Interest 
 
There are many rules that address conflicts of interest that are part of the Indiana Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  Of course, the major rule is Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest:  Current Clients.  
Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: Current Clients 
(a)    Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation 
involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: 
(1)     the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or 
(2)    there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially 
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person 
or by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
(b)    Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer 
may represent a client if: 
(1)     the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and 
diligent representation to each affected client; 
(2)    the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3)    the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another 
client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a 
tribunal; and 
(4)    each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
 
In addition to restricting the circumstances under which a lawyer can represent more than one 
party and the requirements to proceed with such an arrangement, the comments to Rule 1.7 
illuminate a number of additional situations which might inhibit a lawyer’s ability to thoroughly, 
diligently and objectively represent a client.  These situations include responsibilities to former 
clients and other third parties, conflicts because of personal interests and when the lawyer 
represents an organization.   
Specific guidance about conflicts of interest between the client and the lawyer are 
covered under Rule 1.8. Conflict of Interest:  Current Clients:  Specific Rules.  These include 
limitations on engaging in business transactions with the client, soliciting gifts from the client, 
negotiating media or literary rights, providing financial assistance to the client, accepting 
compensation for legal services from someone other than the client, participating in aggregated 
settlements or plea agreements, limiting the lawyer’s liability for malpractice, acquiring a 
proprietary interest in a cause of action or engaging in a sexual relationship unless the 
relationship existed beforehand.   
Additional rules cover more specific situations, including duties to former clients:  
Rule 1.9. Duties to Former Clients 
(a)    A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent 
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are 
materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed 
consent, confirmed in writing. 
(b)    A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in 
which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client 
(1)     whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and 
(2)    about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1. 6 and 1.9(c) that is 
material to the matter; unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in 
writing. 
(c)     A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has 
formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: 
(1)     use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client 
except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the 
information has become generally known; or 
(2)    reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would permit or 
require with respect to a client. 
   
Perhaps one of the most significant elements of Rule 1.9 is what imputation of a conflict of 
interest to the lawyer as well as the law firm that he or she is part of.  This is especially evident 
in a legal employment world where people no longer stay at the same law firm for their entire 
careers and where law firms merge, separate and even disband.  Thus, it is worth reading the 
comments to Rule 1.9 regarding lawyers moving between firms carefully.  The imputation of a 
conflict of interest is considered in more detail in Rule 1.10: 
Rule 1.10. Imputation of Conflicts of Interest: General Rule 
(a)    While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when 
any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.9, or 2.2 
unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not 
present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining 
lawyers in the firm. 
(b)    When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from 
thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client 
represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm unless: 
(1)     the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated 
lawyer represented the client; and 
(2)    any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is 
material to the matter. 
(c)     When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, no lawyer associated in the firm shall 
knowingly represent a person in a matter in which that lawyer is disqualified under Rule 1.9 
unless: 
(1)     the personally disqualified lawyer did not have primary responsibility for the matter that 
causes the disqualification under Rule 1.9; 
(2)    the personally disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter 
and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and 
(3)    written notice is promptly given to any affected former client to enable it to ascertain 
compliance with the provisions of this rule. 
(d)    A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the affected client under the 
conditions stated in Rule 1.7. 
(e)    The disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government lawyers 
is governed by Rule 1.11. 
Another issue posed by an increasingly volatile legal employment marketplace are 
situations where a person transitions from being a public officer or employee in government 
service into private practice or has a concurrent appointment with a government agency.  Rule 
1.11 Special Conflicts of Interest for Former or Current Government Officers and Employees 
provides guidance on these types of situations:  
Rule 1.11. Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and Current Government Officers and 
Employees 
(a)    Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who has formerly served as a public 
officer or employee of the government: 
(1)     is subject to Rule 1.9(c); and 
(2)    shall not otherwise represent a client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer 
participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the 
appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing to the 
representation. 
(b)    When a lawyer is disqualified from representation under paragraph (a), no lawyer in the firm 
with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in 
such a matter unless: 
(1)     the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is 
apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and 
(2)    written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to enable it to 
ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule. 
(c)     Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer having information that the lawyer 
knows is confidential government information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a 
public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that 
person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that 
person. As used in this Rule, the term “confidential government information” means 
information that has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this 
Rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal 
privilege not to disclose and which is not otherwise available to the public. A firm with which 
that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the 
disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned 
no part of the fee therefrom. 
(d)    Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or 
employee: 
(1)     is subject to Rules 1.7 and 1.9; and 
(2)    shall not: 
(i)     participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially 
while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless the appropriate 
government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing; or 
(ii)    negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as 
lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and 
substantially, except that a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative 
officer, or arbitrator may negotiate for private employment as permitted by Rule 
1.12(b) and subject to the conditions stated in Rule 1.12(b). 
(e)    As used in this Rule, the term “matter” includes: 
(1)     any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, 
contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular 
matter involving a specific party or parties; and 
(2)    any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government 
agency. 
 
Other roles that may result in a conflict of interest are when a lawyer has previously served as 
judge, arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral, as explained in Rule 1.12 Former Judge, 
Arbitrator, Mediator or Other Third-Party Neutral:    
Rule 1.12. Former Judge, Arbitrator, Mediator or Other Third-Party Neutral 
(a)    Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a 
matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other 
adjudicative officer, arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral, or law clerk to such a 
person, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
(b)    A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as 
lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially 
as a judge or other adjudicative officer or as an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral. 
A lawyer serving as a law clerk to any such person may negotiate for employment with a party 
or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, 
but only after the lawyer has notified the law clerk's employer. 
(c)     If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is 
associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless: 
(1)     the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is 
apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and 
(2)    written notice is promptly given to the parties and any appropriate tribunal to enable them 
to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule. 
(d)    An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multi-member arbitration panel is not 
prohibited from subsequently representing that party. 
 
One situation that has resulted in disciplinary action against lawyers in Indiana is when the 
lawyer “forgets” who his/her client is.  The most common example of this type of situation is 
when the lawyer represents an organization (company) and also tries to – or is inveigled into – 
represent one of the owners or principals of that organization.  Thus, there is considerable 
attention paid to this potential conflict of interest in Rule 1.13 Organization as Client and its 
Comments.   
Rule 1.13. Organization as Client 
(a)    A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its 
duly authorized constituents. 
(b)    If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with 
the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the 
representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law 
which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial 
injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best 
interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the 
best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in 
the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that can 
act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law. 
(c)     Except as provided in paragraph (d), if 
(1)     despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that can 
act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate 
manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and 
(2)    the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in 
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to 
the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the 
organization. 
(d)    Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of 
an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an 
officer, employee or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising 
out of an alleged violation of law. 
(e)    A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's 
actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), or who withdraws under circumstances that 
require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is 
informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal. 
(f)     In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other 
constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents 
with whom the lawyer is dealing. 
(g)    A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, 
employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. 
If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall 
be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be 
represented, or by the shareholders. 
 
Other risks of ethical breaches by the lawyer because of a conflict of interest may stem from the 
lawyer’s duties to prospective clients:   
Rule 1.18. Duties to Prospective Client 
(a)    A person who discusses with a lawyer the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with 
respect to a matter is a prospective client. 
(b)    Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has had discussions with a 
prospective client shall not use or reveal information learned in the consultation, except as Rule 
1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client. 
(c)     A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse 
to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer 
received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that 
person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from 
representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated 
may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in 
paragraph (d). 
(d)    When a lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in paragraph (c), 
representation is permissible if: 
(1)     both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed 
in writing, or: 
(2)    the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to avoid exposure to 
more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to 
represent the prospective client; and 
(i)     the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is 
apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and 
(ii)    written notice is promptly given to the prospective client. 
 
 
 
 
